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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTIDUMPING AND SAFEGUARDS IN 
ARGENTINA  




Starting in the late 191980s, Argentina implemented a series of reforms that were 
revolutionary in speed and scope, including trade liberalization. After implementation of 
these policies, a record number of antidumping (AD) petitions came forward. Under a 
situation of high inflation, the government reinforced its fiscal and monetary policies by 
announcing that it would minimize the use of such measures. The flexible disciplines of the 
existing domestic AD regulations faciliated this objective.  
 
Later, when the GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies were implemented, the 
government made a serious attempt to establish discipline by including liberal regulations, 
and creating special institutional arrangements.  A presumption built into construction of 
the new mechanisms was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the 
resistance against protection. This presumption turned out to be false. Changing 
circumstances, including severe peso overvaluation, had significant impacts on the number 
and outcome of AD investigations. 
 
Regarding safeguards, the government followed the letter and the spirit of the WTO 
agreement. In relation to the number of petitions, few measures have been implemented. 
Rejections were based on a concern for consumer costs and on failure of the industry 
seeking protection to provide a convincing modernization plan. This, plus the fact that 
some cases were brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, have made this a less 
attractive instrument  for protection-seekers than AD. 
 
An important positive side of the story is that unlike previous balance of payments crises, 
in spite of the major crisis that followed the recent devaluation, the hard-won liberalization 





Statistics from the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicate that after 
implementing trade liberalization policies in the early 191990s, Argentina initiated a record 
number of antidumping (AD) investigations. This has triggered criticisms by the media and 
professional economists as indicating a protectionist bent. Is this interpretation correct? To 
what extent have AD and safeguard (SG) measures reversed the trade liberalization 
policies?  
This paper argues that in the drafting of the regulations and in the creation of the 
institutional mechanism that would administer them, Argentina made a serious attempt to 
minimize the risks of protectionism. Nevertheless, over time changing domestic and 
external circumstances, including macroeconomic imbalance and severe peso 
overvaluation, had significant impacts on the number and outcome of AD investigations. 
Though the government attempted to use the discretion that existed in the instruments to 
refrain from protectionist responses, the weight of the investigations under the recently 
adopted WTO rules was to acknowledge petitioners’ “right” to protection rather than to 
refute it.  
The major lessons drawn from the discussion is that the discipline behind use of 
antidumping and safeguards breaks down when the exchange rate is overvalued; in these 
circumstances the tools of these instruments such as the injury test, lose their power to 
discriminate, to limit use.  If all suffer serious injury – as will be the case with an 
overvalued exchange rate, the basic metric of the WTO-sanctioned trade remedies, injury, 
loses its capacity to distinguish one industry from another and therefore, its capacity to 
limit application. In this situation, the disciplines inherent in WTO rules, turned out to be 
more apparent than real.    
In order to grasp a better understanding of what effectively happened and draw 
other lessons, this paper will provide an analysis of the changing circumstances that help to 
understand the outcome of AD and SG investigations in Argentina. The following is the 
layout for the remainder of this chapter. Section II briefly describes the extent of trade 
liberalization measures that were implemented during the late 1980s and early 1990s while 
Section III presents the changes that were specifically introduced to AD and SG legislation. 
Section IV offers a description of the nature of the important institutional reform that was 
implemented in order to administer the injury test on a technical basis. Section V presents 
an analysis of the outcome of AD investigations while Section VI, does the same with the 
safeguard cases. Finally, Section VII draws the main lessons.   
 
 
I.Trade Liberalization and Exchange Rate Policies 
 
  Starting around 1988-89, Argentina undertook a massive program of reform and 
stabilization, intended to markedly reduce the role of government in the economy – 
liberalize, privatize, deregulate, and open to international competition in goods and capital 
flows. The adoption of WTO sanctioned trade policy instruments was a significant part — 
though only a part — of this program. Other instruments that Argentina had previously 
used to manage industry pressures for protection were eliminated, the government’s 
objective was to develop instruments that would provide a means to respond to industry   2 
pressures for ‘exceptions’ to the ongoing process of trade liberalization, but at the same 
time, prove a means to discipline the application of trade restrictions – to ensure that the 
momentum of reform was maintained rather than reversed as had been the case in previous 
attempts.   
This trade liberalization program was essentially completed during the first half of 
the 1990s and unlike the previous attempts and in spite of the serious crisis following the 
devaluation in 2002, it has been sustained. In what follows we summarize what we consider 
to have been some of the circumstances that shaped the outcome of AD and SG 
investigations, including the: i) unilateral and Mercosur trade liberalization programs, ii) 
exchange rate policies, iii) recession and unemployment and, iv) trade performance.  
 
1. Trade liberalization program 
Starting in the late 1980s, trade liberalization policies resulted in a substantial 
reduction in average protection. Table II.1 provides information on ad-valorem tariff rates 
as well as the fraction of tariff lines covered with import licenses. The figures show high 
and increasing protection until 1987-1988, and relatively fast decline thereafter. In 1989 the 
dismantling of discretionary import licenses was completed, and average tariff protection 
declined from 39% in 1988, to 18% in 1989. In addition to these unilateral policies, in 1991 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Tratado de Asunción that created the 
Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur). With some exceptions, the establishment of a 
common external tariff (CET), and the process of intra-regional trade liberalization were  
completed in late 1994
1. 
 




Maximum  Surcharge  Average 
Import 
Licenses (%)* 
1980  100  0  25  0 
1981  75  0  29  0 
1982  55  0  30  4 
1983  55  0  30  15 
1984  55  0  30  51 
1985  55  10  32  52 
1986  55  10  39  47 
1987  50  15  39  51 
1988  50  15  39  32 
1989  30  0  18  0 
1990  24  0  17  0 
1991  35  0  12  0 
1992  35  0  12  0 
      * Percent of tariff lines covered 
    Source:  Nogués (2001). 
                                                 
1 Some industries like steel, textiles and footwear benefited from a prolonged period of tariff dismantling that 
lasted until the end of 1998. Mercosur’s CET is escalated (highest rates for manufactures and lowest for 
fuels), and the average rate during recent years has been around 14% (ALADI 2002).   3 
  Regarding export policies, the most significant changes were introduced to export 
taxes. Historically, Argentina deepened its isolation by imposing high export taxes on 
agricultural and agro-based products where it has strong comparative advantage. For 
example, in the mid 1980s export tax collection represented more than 30% of total exports. 
From here on, these tax rates start to decline and by 1992, average collection represented 
less than 2% of exports
2.        
   
2. Exchange rate policies   
In an attempt to tame inflation, in early 1991 the government introduced by law the 
Convertibility regime that tied the peso to the dollar at par. After that, capital inflows 
financed excess demand and together with residual inflation, resulted in a severe 
overvalued peso. Toward the end of 2001, expectations of devaluation as signaled by the 
level of country risk increased rapidly and a run against deposits in the banking system 
accelerated. Eventually in early 2002, the Convertibility regime is abandoned and a major 
devaluation process unfolded (de la Torre et. al. 2003).  
Figure II.1 shows the time-path of the real exchange rate (RER) against the dollar
3. 
The numbers indicate an important reduction of the average level during the Convertibility 
years from 1991until 2002. This overvaluation  increased the challenges faced by domestic 
producers in adjusting to the trade liberalization program. During the second half of the 
1990s, the overvaluation was also a factor in slowing growth and pushing  the current 
account deficit to unsustainable levels; in the process, the high level of imports signaled to 
















































Figure II.1: Real Exchange Rate, 1985- 2002
 
                                                 
2 The policy of essentially no taxes on exports continued until the devaluation of 2002 when they were 
reimposed. In the early 1990s, financial subsidies granted to non-competitive manufactured exports were also 
dismantled (Nogués 2001). As discussed in the next section, this dismantling allowed Argentina to sign a 
subsidy-countervailing agreement with the US with clear gains to domestic exporters. 
3 The RER is estimated as the nominal exchange rate times the ratio of the US to Argentina’s cost of living 
indexes.   4 
3. Growth, crisis and unemployment 
  In addition to these negative circumstances, during the 1990s Argentina was hit by 
several negative external shocks including: i) the Tequila’s effect that started in late 1994, 
ii) the Asian crisis in 1997, iii) the Russian default in 1998 and, iv) the reduction of 
international commodity prices in the second half of the 1990s. In spite of these negative 
circumstances, the economy could generally cope well and continued growing until mid- 
1998 but after that, it entered into a prolonged period of recession that lasted until late 
2002
4. This recession was accentuated by Brazil’s devaluation of early 1999. 
During 2001 and under critical circumstances, a number of measures were 
attempted in order to reverse what by then was irreversible: a major devaluation. In 
particular, we note the increase in the ad-valorem tariffs on consumer goods to 35%, the 
maximum level that Argentina had bounded during the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations. 
This increase is indicative of the severe pressures that were being put by imports on the 
trade regime including as we shall see, on the AD and SG mechanisms. In any case, these 
measures might have only delayed the severe devaluation that begun to unfold in January 
2002, and during this year, the economy collapsed when GDP declined by 10.9%. 
Following the devaluation, three major policy changes were introduced to the trade 
regime. First, as imports declined rapidly, tariffs on consumption goods were returned to 
the level of the Mercosur CET. Second, high and escalated export taxes were reintroduced 
as a measure to finance the government in a situation when the country had defaulted on its 
external debt. Finally, foreign exchange controls were tightened. We shall see how the 
devaluation was also accompanied by a reduced demand for AD and SG measures. 
Another important aspect of the macroeconomic scenario was the high rates of open 
unemployment that continue to prevail. In 1993 and for the first time in many years, the 
unemployment rate surpassed the 10% level to reach 20% in 1995 and declined thereafter 
to around 15% where it is standing today. 
 
4. Trade response 
The trade liberalization policies resulted in an important increase in trade flows. 
Figure II.2 shows that imports increased from less than five billion dollars in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, to more than $20 billion dollars in 1994-95, and more than $30 billion 
dollars in the late 1990s. During this same period, exports increased from around six billion 
dollars to more than $26 billions in the late 1990s. Not surprisingly, imports from Mercosur 
grew considerably more rapidly than those from third countries: between 1990 and 2001, 
aggregate imports grew five times while those from the Mercosur grew by 6.7 times. As 
indicated later, the relatively fast growth of imports from Brazil, shows in a high demand 
AD investigations against this origin. 
                                                 
4 Starting in 1990, Argentina’s economy recorded the following growth rates (%): 1990: -2.4; 1991: 12.7; 
1992: 11.9; 1993: 5.9%; 1994: 5.8; 1995: -2.9; 1996: 5.5; 1997: 8.1; 1998: 3.9; 1999: -3.4; 2000: -0.5; 2001: -
4.4; 2002: -10.9 and, 2003: 8.4.    5 





























Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC).
Balance Export  Import
 
5. Summing-up 
  Argentina’s trade liberalization policies of the early 1990s were significant and 
together with other important components of the reform program, played a major role in 
changing the economic trends of the country. Until 2001-2002 when trade policies were 
only partially reversed, the economy experienced the longest period with an open trade 
regime that it has seen in several decades. Nevertheless, the severe overvaluation of the 
peso, accelerated imports to unsustainable levels and serious injury to domestic producers 
became a generalized phenomenon that would had obvious impacts on the outcome of AD 
investigations (Section V). 
   
 
II.  Reforming Antidumping and Safeguard Legislation 
 
The economic cabinet that came into power in early 1991, was concerned with the risks 
that over time, the AD and SG mechanisms along WTO guidelines, would be captured by 
powerful industries to the detriment of the trade liberalization program
5. This Cabinet also 
                                                 
5 In a speech delivered in April 2002, Minister Cavallo alerted about the dangers of AD measures when he 
asserted that: “…behind several antidumping petitions, there are people who would like to return to a closed 
economy, so that each one of us who live in this country would have to pay higher prices…”.   6 
concluded that coming out of a high inflation process
6, import competition played an 
important role in the goal to stabilize the price level.   
Under this framework, the attention of policymakers was centred in two matters: the 
content of AD and SG legislation, and the institutions that would administer the new 
regulations. In this section we start with a brief discussion of some factors that prompted 
the demand for “updating” the AD legislation. After that, we discuss the political-economy 
forces that shaped the contents of the domestic regulations.  
 
1.  External and domestic pressures for reforming legislation 
Under increasing competitive pressures, the liberalization program discussed in the 
previous section lacked what domestic groups called an “effective” mechanism for 
providing relief to industries that were injured by imports. Although by the early 1990s 
Argentina had been a GATT Member for several years, it was not a signatory of the Tokyo 
Codes on AD and countervailing measures (CVM) (GATT 1986). This situation created 
problems for both, the export and import-competing industries. On the export side, the 
major problem was in CVM investigations initiated in the United States (US). The reason 
was that this country’s legislation  did not apply the injury test to imports from countries 
that were not signatories to the GATT Code.  In this environment, Argentina’s subsidized 
exports faced high risks of being countervailed (Finger and Nogués 1987)
7. In order to 
eliminate this source of uncertainty, the government negotiated and in 1991 signed a 
bilateral agreement according to which the country would dismantle its export subsidies 
and in exchange, the US would grant the benefits of the injury test
8.  
On the import side, the conclusion by the government was that the existing AD 
regulations in the Código Aduanero (Law 22,415 of 1981) were excessively protectionist 
and conflicted with the multilateral disciplines to which the government wanted to move 
closer as a way putting discipline. For example, according to the Código Aduanero (CA), a 
margin of dumping above 15% was sufficient evidence to conclude that the domestic 
industry was being injured. Domestic producers also complained that the regulations in the 
CA provided too much discretion and demanded a more “effective” instrument. 
Until around the late 1980s, this legislation created no problems because having 
being a closed economy for several decades, antidumping measures had hardly ever been 
demanded and therefore, used
9. This changed when imports began growing rapidly (Figure 
II.2), and the business community put pressures on the government for implementing 
import-relief measures. 
 
                                                 
6 The average annual inflation rates in 1989 and 1990 as measured by the cost of living index had been 
3,080% and 2,314% respectively.  
7 In fact during the 1980s, the US countervailed several imports from Argentina including: leather clothing, 
leather footwear, textile and clothing, steel pipes, petroleum tubes, wool, and several other steel items 
(Nogués 1991). 
8 Compliance with this agreement resulted in a significant reduction in the number of US countervailing cases 
against Argentina. 
9 Some AD measures were implemented in the late 70s and early 1980s when the peso was also highly 
overvalued. Initially these measures were adopted under Law 21,388 “Régimen de Aplicación de Derechos 
Antidumping Compensatorios y Móviles” of 1978. Later, this Law was merged in the 1981 CA under which 
the initial AD cases of the 1990s were processed.    7 
2. Political economy of AD and SG legislations 
These shortcomings convinced the government that it had to update its AD and 
CVM legislation. The first step was the passage of Law 24,176 in September of 1992 that 
incorporated the Tokyo Codes, and Decree 2,121 of 1994, that included the operational 
guidelines. The second step was the creation of the Comisión Nacional de Comercio 
Exterior (CNCE)
10 also in 1994, discussed in the next section.  
The drafting of operational guidelines to administer the new GATT AD 
investigations created a debate between the government and a group of powerful import-
competing industries. After passage of Law 24,176 the government hired a prominent 
Washington-based lawyer who was asked to draft relatively liberal AD regulations (Horlick 
1992). In parallel, the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA) who represents relatively protected 
manufacturing enterprises, also proposed AD regulations to the government (UIA 1992). 
Some of the enterprises represented by the UIA had been the target of US investigations 
and therefore, they were well aware of the highly protectionist nature of this country’s AD 
legislation.   
Eventually, Decree 766/94 that created the CNCE and the operating regulations in 
Decree 2,121/94, indicates that the government favored relatively liberal regulations vis a 
vis the more protectionist alternative of adopting US-like regulations supported by the UIA. 
Examples of some of these regulations included: 
 
Lesser duty: Argentina’s legislation offers the freedom to apply “lesser duty”, or AD 
measures that are considered sufficient to eliminate injury even if they are lower than 
the margin of dumping. The principle of “lesser duty” was established by Decree 
766/94 as follows: “En el análisis y recomendación de las medidas, la Comisión deberá 
orientarse con el criterio de contrarrestar el daño y deberá evitar la utilización de la 
normativa con fines proteccionistas...”. 
Type of measure: Unlike other countries where AD measures are expressed as an ad-
valorem duty and paid by all imports from the target enterprise / country, Argentina 
determines a minimum FOB export price below which specific duties are applied to 
reach the threshold level. Imports carrying FOB prices above the specified level pay no 
AD duties
11. 
Prospective methodology: Unlike the US where measures are applied retrospectively, a 
methodology that creates high business uncertainty to exporters (Finger 1993), 
Argentina applies measures prospectively from the date that the preliminary or final 
decisions are published.   
Duration: Initially, AD measures were usually applied for short periods: two to three 
years.  
Competition authority: Government officials managing antidumping investigations 
have the right to consult the competition authority to evaluate the likely impact of AD 
measures.  
National interest: Measures decided by the Minister of Economy can take into account 
“…la política general de comercio y al interés público” (Article 30 of Decree 1,326/98).  
This article opens the possibility to deny AD measures in spite of final positive 
dumping and injury determinations. This clause has been used only once.  
                                                 
10 Discussed in the next section. 
11 Very recently, in some cases, Argentina has begun to establish ad-valorem AD duties.   8 
 
    Safeguards 
  Before the passage of Law 24,425 that adopted the UR agreements, Argentina had 
not issued regulations for safeguards under GATT Article XIX. Again, the fact that the 
economy had been closed for decades was the main reason explaining the lack of demand 
for these measures. Another reason was that unlike AD, the country’s exports had not been 
affected by safeguards measures and therefore, neither the business community nor the 
government was knowledgeable about the effects of this instrument. Even after passage of 
Law 24,425 in 1994, it took nearly two years before safeguard regulations were issued by 
Decree 1,059 of September 1996. Therefore, during the crucial years while the economy 
was adjusting to the trade liberalization program, Argentina operated without a formal 
safeguard regime. It should also be noted that Mercosur was created without a safeguard 




   During the early 1990s and in spite of opposition from some interest groups, the 
government was successful in passing relatively liberal AD legislation. Shortly after Decree 
2,121/94 containing the operating regulations had been issued, the Congress approved Law 
24,425 that contains “The Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations” (WTO 
1996). Since then, only one reform to the AD regulations has been implemented through 
Decree 1,326/98, which included procedural modifications of no substance. As we shall 
argue in Section V, following pressures from the business community, during 2001 the 
government drafted regulations that replicated some of the worst characteristics of the US 
legislation. Nevertheless, the devaluation first, and strong growth in 2003 after, reduced the 
demand for AD measures and therefore, the pressures for reforming the AD regulations and 
these reforms were never implemented.   
 
 
III.  Creation of the Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior (CNCE) 
 
Following passage of Law 24,176 that as said adopted the Tokyo Codes, the 
government began assessing alternative ways of administering the new legislation. The 
government, convinced of the view that discipline over use of antidumping would have to 
come from the injury test, looked for a workable way to structure/administer such a test.  
After surveying experiences in other countries, it concluded that the execution of an injury 
investigation would have to be entrusted to an independent commission. This section 
summarizes the history of the process behind this decision. 
 
1.The role of injury 
At the time, one major piece of evidence in the government’s assessment regarding 
the creation of the CNCE was the conclusion in authors like Finger and Murray (1990) that 
the: “…patterns of petitions and of results suggests strongly that injury to US 
                                                 
12 This resistance to create a Mercosur safeguard mechanism reflects more the position of Brazil than of the 
other Members. During the initial years, there were some temporary exemptions to the intra-regional trade 
liberalization program and some industries also benefited with longer phase-in periods. Nevertheless, these 
transitional safeguards were mostly ad-hoc.    9 
producers…by import competition is what the antidumping and countervailing law are 
about…”. The findings reported in this and other articles indicated quite clearly that 
although it is relatively easy to play with the numbers in order to find a positive margin of 
dumping, the same is not always the case for injury particularly when as in the US, it is 
evaluated by an independent agency like the International Trade Commission (ITC). For 
example, these authors concluded that of 100 petitions that end with a formal 
determination, 56 would not result in a final antidumping or countervailing duty order and, 
of them, 48 cases by a negative injury determination. This record was a central element in 
convincing the government of the early 1990s, that an agency that could replicate this 
performance would add an element of restraint to the administration of AD investigations.  
 
2. Obstacles to creating an independent agency 
Given that a technical evaluation of injury was the major consideration that 
prompted the creation of the CNCE, such a decision also implied that Argentina was 
adopting a two-track mechanism: the margins of subsidy and dumping would be assessed 
by the Secretariat of Industry and Trade (Secretaría de Industria y Comercio)
13, while injury 
would be assessed by the CNCE. 
Early in the process, a major obstacle to creating an independent office was made 
evident. Independence required a law but the Economic Cabinet concluded that submission 
to Congress had no chances of passage. It also feared that a Congressional debate could 
undermine and change the relatively liberal regulations that it was proposing to adopt.  
Therefore, the CNCE was created by Presidential Decree 766/94 with a strong mandate to 
protect the interests of consumers
14: “…with the purpose of ensuring that prices paid by 
consumers do not exceed those that they would had paid under conditions of normal 
international competition, maximum levels of efficiency and transparency must be sought 
in the administration of trade policies against unfair trade”.  
As said, the main goal behind the creation of the CNCE was that it would undertake 
injury investigations with high technical standards, and that its decisions would be binding:  
whenever it reaches a preliminary or final negative determination, the investigation is 
closed without measures. 
 
3. Decision-making mechanism 
  As is the case with the Secretariat of Industry and Trade, the CNCE functions under 
the Ministry of Economy (Ministerio de Economía) and its determinations are taken by a 
majority vote of its President and four Commissioners. Essentially, the process has two 
steps: (1) an injury report is prepared by the technical staff, and (2) the Board of the CNCE 
decides whether the evidence supports or not a positive determination
15. When this type of 
decision-mechanism was adopted, the thought was that rent-seeking entrepreneurs would 
approach a Commission with greater care than they would approach one decision-maker 
more directly subject to political pressures.   
                                                 
13 Over the years, the Secretary of Industry and Trade has changed names several times depending on its 
changing mandate. At the time of writing this article, its name is:  “Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y de la 
Pequeña y Mediana Empresa”. 
14 A Decree can be overturned by another one, while changing a Law requires Congressional debate.  
15 Consensus has not been the common denominator of these votes.   10 
4. Staffing and budget 
  In the creation of the CNCE, achieving technical excellence was an important goal. 
Except for the President and the Commissioners that are political appointees, the 
responsibility for its staffing was delegated to a private consulting company specialized in 
the recruitment of qualified human resources. The comments gathered on this experience 
indicate that this strategy has had good results
16. Injury investigations have been done 
professionally and the record indicates that exporting countries have had no serious 
objections with the work undertaken by the CNCE. 
  Nevertheless over the years, successive fiscal adjustments have deteriorated public 
sector wages with clearly negative implications on employment profiles. As an example, 
starting in early 2002 and for more than two years, public officials could earn no more than 
$3,000 pesos or around $1,000 dollars per month; this applied to the President of Argentina 
as well as the President of the CNCE and its Commission members. Given this constraint, 




Following passage of Law 24,172 that adopted the Tokyo Codes, the government 
began assessing alternative ways of administering the new legislation. In the end, it 
determined that an independent agency that would undertake the injury investigations was 
important to add some degree of economic meaning to antidumping measures. Creation of 
the CNCE took place approximately at the same time that the country adopted the Uruguay 
Round agreements. The question of interest therefore is: how successful has it been in 
disentangling those requests that deserved from those that did not deserve protection?  
   
 
IV.  Determinants of the Petitions and Outcomes of AD Investigations 
 
The last two sections argued that Argentina approved liberal antidumping legislation 
and created a technically-oriented institution to manage the injury investigations. 
Nevertheless, the statistical information indicates that following these reforms, there was 
a high number of AD investigations and as we shall see, an increasing share of them 
ending with positive injury determinations. What went wrong?  
This section will argue that while the economy was growing, the AD mechanism 
was able to sort out the deserving from the undeserving petitioners. Nevertheless, 
recession and peso overvaluation increased the share of technical reports by the CNCE 
indicating that imports were inflicting serious injury to domestic producers.  
  In order to have a sharper picture of what happened, the analysis in this section will 
discuss the following topics: 1) impact of political determination and economic cycles on 
the demand for AD, 2) country incidence and coverage of AD measures, 3) overvaluation 
and the incidence of injury determinations, 4) dumping determinations and AD measures 
                                                 
16 Commissioners can only be removed by the Executive Power. Also, Members of the Board and the staff are 
required to follow behavioral procedures and in fact, Decree 766/94 stipulates that failure to comply with this 
requirement can trigger removal of the staff violating it.  
17 As will be indicated in Section V, unlike the CNCE, budget constraints have weaken the capacity of the 
Undersecretary of Gestión Comercial Externa (UGE) to complete accurate dumping investigations. For 
example, the UGE has lacked resources to undertake in-situ verifications of prices.    11 
and, 5) mounting pressures to replicate a US-like antidumping mechanism. The section 
ends with brief summary that attempts to unify the story that emerges. 
 
1. Impact of political determination and economic cycles 
Between the late 1980s when trade liberalization measures started to be 
implemented and 1994, Argentina administered AD measures under the guidelines of the 
Código Aduanero (CA). According to the 1994 and 1995 annual reports of the CNCE 
(www.mecon.gov.ar/cnce/informes_anuales.htm), during these years the government 
received 135 AD petitions of which 69 investigations were initiated, and measures were 
applied in 19 cases. These numbers indicate that trade liberalization was accompanied by 
an important increase in the demand for AD protection but the political determination of the 
government remained in favor of openness
18.  
As said, the strategy of the government during the initial years of the trade 
liberalization program was to delay decisions on AD investigations while the new 
regulatory and institutional architectures described in Sections III and IV were being 
completed. Because under the regulations of the CA used to process the early petitions, 
there were no time limits for the different steps of AD investigations including opening 
one, the government retained important degrees of discretion. Former Minister Cavallo 
often reiterated that the government would be very careful in the use of AD measures until 
the price level had been stabilized. Recall that during those days, the taming of inflation 
was a major policy objective and the Government considered that import-competition had 
an important role to play in attaining it.  
Furthermore, during the early years of operation of the CNCE, the relatively high 
incidence of negative determinations indicated below, is likely to have reduced the number 
of “frivolous” petitions. Political determination in favor of openness and a technically-
oriented CNCE defined an environment where ex-ante, an AD petition had a high 
likelihood of ending in a negative determination. Another factor reducing the demand for 
AD protection was the time and money a petitioner would have to expend to present and 
defend an investigation with a low likelihood of providing positive returns
19.  
In January of 1995, the CNCE began operating and between 1995 and early 2004, it 
completed 111 investigations, or 166 when each origin is considered as a different case
20. 
In this relatively brief experience, a first point to note is the cyclical behavior of the number 
of new investigations: recessions were accompanied by increasing number of initiations 
while during growth years, this number declined. Figure V.1 shows that a relatively high 
number of 25 investigations were initiated during the crisis year of 1995 (Tequila effect), 
but when the economy regained strong growth until mid-1998, initiations declined 
drastically and reached only four cases in this year. After that, four consecutive years of 
negative growth, increased initiations to an average of 25 per year i.e. 79% higher than the 
                                                 
18 Nevertheless after 1998, 22 additional cases of the 69 that were opened between 1988 and 1994 ended with 
measures.  
19 By some accounts of key informants, perhaps as much as 50% of potential petitions, in the end decided 
against submission. Regarding cost, by the estimate of one informed observer, during the years of 
Convertibility the processing of an antidumping investigation could cost firms around $60,000 dollars in legal 
fees. This sum was and still is well beyond the means of small and several medium sized enterprises. 
20 Annex 2 presents a description of the administrative procedures followed by AD investigations.   12 
average number during the growth years from 1996 to 1998
21. Finally, after the devaluation 
in early 2002 and strong growth in 2003, the number of initiations declines to 14 in 2002, 
and only 4 in 2003.  
 




















































































   Source: Author’s elaboration with data from the CNCE and INDEC (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas y Censos).      
 
 
2. Winners and losers of the AD mechanism   
 
Table V.1 presents the incidence of AD investigations by requesting industries. As 
seen, 1/3 of all the cases have been demanded by producers of steel and steel products, and 
another 13% by chemical industries. Except for electrical equipment, the incidence of AD 
investigations in favor of other industries has been much lower. As discussed in Section III, 
one hypothesis explaining the high incidence of AD cases requested by steel producers is 
that during the 1980s this industry had been hit by several investigations particularly in the 
US (Nogués 1991). As a consequence, it was more under alert of how AD can be used for 
obtaining import-relief than other industries
22.   
 
                                                 
21 Other factors that pushed the number of investigations during the recession years were revisions of earlier 
cases where measures had normally been imposed for two years, and the end of the phase-in period of 
Mercosur in early 1999 where as said, safeguards are not allowed. 
22 This is only part of the story. As seen in Annex 1, the high incidence of the steel cases is accounted not only 
by what is known as “big steel” like cold-rolled and hot-rolled laminated products but also, by several smaller 
industries such as locks, bathroom faucets, etc. that  had not been under AD attacks in the earlier years.     13 
Table V.1 
Antidumping Investigations by Requesting Industries 
1995-2004 
  Number of 
Investigations 
Percent 
Positive  Injury 
Determinations* 
Steel & Steel Products  36  94.4 
Chemicals  14  42.9 
Textiles & Textile Products   5          100.0 
Plastic & Plastic Products   6  83.3 
Electrical Equipment   9  55.6 
Processed Food   6  33.3 
Machinery & Non-Electrical 
Equipment   4  75.0 
Wood & Paper Products   4  75.0 
Rubber & Rubber Products   3  33.3 
Consumer Durables  11          100.0 
Others  13  76.9 
Total          111  76.6 
* When the final determination is negative in some parts and positive in others, we have assumed a positive 
finding. If we had assumed that the six mix cases in Annex 1 were negative, then the percent of positive 
determinations would had declined from 77% to 70%.   
Note: Negative preliminary injury determinations are taken as negative cases and undertakings as positive 
determinations. Annex 1 indicates that of the 26 negative cases, 10 were decided at the preliminary stage; 15 
at the final stage, and one on the basis of the national interest. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Annex 1. 
 
The last column of the table presents the percent of cases with a positive injury 
finding. It is of interest to note that while 94% of the steel cases ended with a positive 
determination, only 50% of the chemical cases did so. As seen, 77% of all investigations 
ended with a positive injury determination, a figure that is higher than what has been 
estimated for other countries including the US (Irwin 2002), and Mexico (Francois and 
Niels 2003).  
 
Table V.2: Argentina’s AD investigations by target country; 1995-2004* 
 
Brazil  31 
China  34 
United States    9 
European Union*  42 
Others  50 
Total cases/country        166 
* In this table, each target country is taken as a case. One case against the EU has been taken as a 
single case.            
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Annex 1.   14 
Table V.2 shows that at the country level, China and Brazil have been the hardest 
hit by Argentina’s AD investigations. The high incidence of cases against Brazil can  be 
explained by the regional liberalization in Mercosur and the absence of a safeguard 
mechanism for fine-tuning intra-regional trade flows. This implies that import relief 
measures can only be provided by AD measures or some other obscure non-tariff barrier
23. 
   Table V.3 presents two indicators of the importance of AD: the value of imports 
covered as a share of total imports, and the value of apparent consumption affected as a 
share of manufactured value added
24. As in other studies, the first indicator shows relatively 
low values but this is not surprising given that the objective of AD measures is precisely to 
reduce imports. Still, the rapidly increasing trend since 1995 is evidence of an AD system 
that is moving closer to the needs of petitioners. 
  The second indicator captures better the economic importance of AD protection on 
the domestic economy.  It shows the value of apparent consumption covered by AD 
investigations and AD measures (published by the CNCE), as a share of value added by the 
manufacturing sector (published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, 
INDEC). This indicator also shows an increasing trend from less than 1% to around 6%, 
where it was standing in 2003. 
Table V.3 
Coverage of AD Measures (%) 




1995  0.10  0.50 
1996  0.30  1.50 
1997  0.80  4.30 
1998  0.70  4.50 
1999  1.10  6.40 
2000  1.30  7.90 
2001  1.80  6.20 
2002  2.10  4.10 
2003  1.60  5.90 
                           * Imports under investigations / Total imports (%). 
                ** Apparent consumption  / Value added by the manufacturing sector (%). 
               Source: Author’s elaboration from data published by CNCE and INDEC.   
 
3. Overvaluation, recession and the incidence of injury determinations 
From what we know, the CNCE has met the goals that its original designers had; its 
injury analysis have been driven by objective economic factors and there are no precedents 
indicating that foreign exporters have had serious objections to its work. Therefore, we take 
its findings as a good approximation of the extent of injury suffered by the domestic 
economy.  
                                                 
23 According to the annual reports of the CNCE, during 1995-2003, the share of Brazil in imports covered 
with AD measures is 40%, while the share of this country in the number of AD investigations is 19% 
(TableV.2).  
24 In both cases, imports affected include the sum of the value of imports under AD measures and under 
investigations. Imports under investigation are included because market conditions are likely to be affected 
since the very moment that an AD investigation is requested (see for example Prusa 1992). An earlier 
estimate of the import coverage indicator is presented in Sanguinetti and Salustro (1999).   15 
The analysis presented in Section II and the time trends of initiations (Figure V.1) 
suggest several hypotheses. First, currency overvaluation-cum recession increased the 
likelihood of injury which should show in increasing shares of positive determinations. 
Second, the peso devaluation in early 2002 and strong growth in 2003, should have relaxed 
the demand for antidumping and safeguard measures. Finally, given the important efforts 
that were put in designing liberal regulations and creating technically-oriented institutions, 
a relatively high number of negative injury determinations should have characterized the 
functioning of Argentina’s AD mechanism. The statistical analysis that follows will test 
these hypotheses.  
Table V.4  shows the outcome of the injury investigations between 1995 and 2003. 
The evidence indicates that between 1995 and 1998 when the economy was growing 
strongly, the share of negative injury determinations by the CNCE was relatively high but 
during the following years, this share declined. Our hypothesis is that the continued 
overvaluation of the peso, and the prolonged recession between late 1998 and 2002, 
increased the likelihood that technical reports prepared under the WTO AD guidelines, 
would show in an increasing share of positive injury determinations. Second, regarding the 
effects of the 2002 devaluation and 2003 growth, the figures indicate that although these 
factors reduced the number of petitions and initiations (Figure V.1), they had no impact 
 
Table V.4 
Injury Determinations in AD Investigations: 1995- 2004 
 Years  Determination*  Preliminary  Final** 
Positive  18  21 
Negative    7  14  1995 – 1998 
% Negative   28.0       40.0 
Positive  45  64 
Negative    2    3  1999 – 2004 
% Negative     4.5      4.5 
Positive     2.0  31 
Negative  2    1  1999-2001 
% Negative   10.0      3.2 
Positive         25  33 
Negative  0    2  2002-2003 
% Negative  0      6.1 
Positive         63  85 
Negative           9  17  1995-2004 
% Negative  12.5    16.7 
* Cases included in each period are determined according to the year when the final determination was published.  
** The case decided on national interest (Decree 69/ of 2001), is taken as a final negative determination. 
Note 1: Undertakings are assumed to be final positive determinations; Annex 1 shows that there were two 
undertakings during 1995-1998, and four during 1995-2004.  
Note 2: In investigations arriving at mixed results, I have assumed that the determination is positive.  
Note 3: Revisions are counted as individual cases. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information presented Annex 1.   16 
on negative injury determinations
25. One hypothesis is that the investigations that were 
concluded during this period, were still affected from injury attributed to imports in 
previous years. Finally, the incidence of negative injury determinations under the CNCE 
has not been higher than that observed in other countries with independent commissions 
like the US (Irwin 2002), or with centralized systems like Mexico (Francois and Niels 
2003).  
  In one important sense, the new investigations under WTO regulations differed 
from the previous regulations in the Código Aduanero: degree of discretion. The new 
regulations took away much of the discretion that was in the old system, including the 
discretion of if and when to open an investigation. Recall that under the system that 
prevailed until 1994, the government received 135 AD petitions of which only 69 were 
investigated. These numbers show that at least in part, it was the exploitation of the 
discretion in the old system that kept relatively low the number of investigations
26;  strong 
growth during the early 1990s, and political determination in favour of openness were the 
other important factors
27.    
 
4. Dumping determinations and AD measures 
In most cases, the Undersecretary of Gestión Comercial Externa (UGE), has arrived 
at positive determinations on dumping and therefore, this stage of the investigation has 
generally not worked as a filter of AD petitions. It should be said that the UGE lacks 
resources to verify in-situ, the prices offered by exporters. This has been a problem in some 
decisions on dumping margins particularly, after a 2001 WTO ruling against Argentina in a 
ceramics tile case
28. In any event, according to key informants, this ruling has made the 
UGE more careful in the use of information on prices provided by both, the petitioners and 
the exporters. 
                                                 
25 The evidence in Annex 1 indicates that some of the industries receiving AD protection during recent years 
include: tires, flat steel and iron products (“big steel”), laminated steel (“big steel”), chemical products, 
faucets, air conditioning equipment, etc.   
26 Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that the CNCE retained authority to administer Article 5.3 of the 
Antidumping Agreement on initiations stating that: “The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy 
of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the 
initiation of an investigation”. Key informants have indicated that until around 1998, an important share of 
petitions did not pass the standards set by the CNCE to administer this article.  
27 As discussed in the next section, until the late 1990s when WTO rulings against Argentina were published, 
the textiles and footwear industries received safeguard protection. These measures also lessened the demand 
for AD protection. 
28 In the case: “ARGENTINA - MEDIDAS ANTIDUMPING DEFINITIVAS APLICADAS A LAS 
IMPORTACIONES DE BALDOSAS DE CERÁMICA PARA EL SUELO PROCEDENTES DE ITALIA”, 
Italy explained that some Italian firms had presented price information under confidentiality together with 
non-confidential summaries so that the UGE could determine dumping margins at the firm level.  Italy argued 
that when the UGE decided not to utilize the information provided in these summaries, Argentina violated 
Article 6 of the Antidumping Agreement. The Panel concluded that: “Argentina actuó de manera 
incompatible con el párrafo 8 del artículo 6 y con el Anexo II del Acuerdo Antidumping al descartar en gran 
parte la información presentada por los exportadores para la determinación del valor normal y del precio de 
exportación, sin informar a los exportadores de las razones del 
rechazo”(www.docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1 ). Note that lacking resources to verify 
information can put a government in a bind: if it rejects the information supplied by the petitioner, it is in 
political trouble at home, perhaps caught up in judicial appeal. If it rejects the information supplied by the 
exporter, it in trouble in the WTO. We owe this comment to Mike Finger.   17 
  Regarding the stringency of AD barriers, this is a tricky issue to assess. The reason 
is that imports can be redirected from a country against which measures have been 
imposed, towards other origins. Therefore, an AD duty can be very high but if the source of 
imports can be substituted, then the protectionist impact may not be that serious. On the 
other hand, AD duties can be relatively low but if barriers are imposed against all of the 
major suppliers, then these measures are likely to be unavoidably costly
29.    
Keeping this in mind, in what follows we offer brief comments on some 
characteristics of Argentina’s AD measures. First in regard to the methodology used to 
assess the margin of dumping, the information presented in Annex 1 shows that in the great 
majority of cases, the investigations have estimated normal values from domestic market 
prices
30. The most significant exception has been cases against China where normal values 
have been estimated from domestic prices in surrogate market economies. It is also of 
interest to note that normal values from cost-based estimates have been used in only one 
case: laminated steel products imported from Kazakhstan and Rumania (Annex 1).  
A second issue of interest to note is that the duration of AD measures have been 
increasing. During the initial years until around 1998, this duration was relatively short: 
usually two to three years. Nevertheless more recently, the normal duration has been 
extended and now it is not uncommon to find measures being imposed for five years 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/cnce/Archivos/cuadros/m_vigentes.pdf).  
A third topic refers to the nature of the AD measure. We mentioned before that 
during the initial years of operation of the system, the usual measure was the determination 
of a reference FOB export price; when the price of imports is lower than this reference, a 
specific duty would close the gap. On the other hand, imports with invoice prices above the 
regulated FOB price, paid no duties. More recently however, the system has moved closer 
to one where the dumping margin is transformed to an equivalent ad-valorem duty that is 
paid by all imports from the target country/enterprise i.e. closer to the US system. 
On lesser duty, the analysis presented above indicated that this was a characteristic 
of the liberal approach that prevailed when Argentina’s AD mechanism was designed 
during the early 1990s. Regarding the extent to which lesser duties have been applied, it is 
of interest to note that contrary to our expectations, the information presented in Table V.5 
indicates that during the initial years of operation of the AD mechanism, in relatively few 
cases was the concept of lesser duty applied: three out of 16 determinations. This contrast 
with 22 cases out of 78 determinations after 1998 when most of the time, the economy was 
in recession. This indicates how the degrees of freedom allowed by WTO rules can be used 
to lessen protectionist impacts of AD measures even in situations of severe recession. 
Finally Table V.5 presents estimates of the average maximum margins of dumping 
in ad-valorem equivalents. Because Argentina has usually determined minimum FOB 
export prices below which specific AD duties are applied, the rates in Annex 1 correspond 
to maximum values; when export prices are above the minimum, no specific AD duties are 
                                                 
29 In general, we believe that competitive imports have remained free of AD duties and therefore, importers 
have been able to substitute country of origin obviously at a cost. However, in cases like “big steel” ones, 
information indicates that a chain of successive investigations have affected imports of hot and cold rolled 
laminated plates from most origins (Annex 1). In most instances, AD investigations of these imports have 
been opened in response to protectionist measures (safeguards and AD barriers) from industrial countries that 
have depressed world steel prices.  
30 The source of information on prices has usually been: journals, data gathered by commercial attaches, or 
directly provided by the exporters.     18 
applied (Section III). This as well as the fact that Argentina has often applied lesser duties, 
implies that the numbers in Table V.5 can be well above the AD duties actually applied. 
Therefore, we take these numbers more as an indication of dumping margins than of the 
stringency of AD measures. With this in mind, we first note that the estimates for the 1995-
2004 period, show dumping margins that are unusually high. Second and more surprising to 
us, is that the breakdown of this period in the high growth and low growth years reveals 
that high dumping margins has been a persistent characteristic and not one that has been 
particularly acute in bad times
31.  
Summing up, Argentina has not resorted to what is generally considered to be the 
most subjective and protectionist methodology for estimating normal values namely, cost-
based estimates. It is also important to note that in more than 20% of the observations 
presented in Annex 1, the AD measure has been a lesser duty, and this was the case even 
during the recessionary years between 1999 and 2002; the WTO rules indicated injury but 
still the government applied some of the liberal dimensions of its legislation.  
 
Table V.5: Antidumping Measures 
 
Measure  1995-1998  1999-2003  1995-2003 
 
Duty criteria, number of cases: 
      -  Full Dumping 
























Notes: The end-points of the different periods are defined by the dates when the final measures were 
announced.  
Under the duty criteria column of Annex 1, the figures are calculated from the number of countries under 
investigations and not from the number of cases. 
For several cases, we lack information on dumping margins.   
Source: Based on Annex 1. 
 
Another example was the application of the national interest clause in one case decided in 
2003
32. Nevertheless, it would be an error to conclude from here that Argentina’s AD 
mechanism is relatively lenient. The fact of the matter is that after its initial years, the 
system has evolved towards one that has provided higher levels of protection through inter 
alia, extending the duration of the measures and changing the nature of the AD barrier. But 
                                                 
31 In order to complete the picture, we have estimated on the basis of information in Annex 1, that the average 
minimum margin of dumping is 109%. Again for the reasons explained in the text, this number is not an 
indication of the height of AD duties. In addition to the factors mentioned there, we have been informed that 
there have been some cases / enterprises that have been found by the UGE not to be dumping.  
32Imports of glifosato from China. This product is an herbicide developed by Monsanto which in combination 
with genetically modified seeds, accounts for an important share of increasing agricultural productivity 
observed in recent years. Here, the final dumping and injury determinations were positive but the case was 
closed without AD measures.  The political-economy of this decision had to do with two important factors. 
First, China has become a major importer of several agricultural products from Argentina, specially soybean 
which uses glifosato. The second factor has to do with a forceful domestic agricultural lobby indicating that a 
wrong would be done if AD measures would had been implemented against these imports.   19 
the most important factor indicating a protectionist trend, increasing share of positive injury 
determinations, was not the effect of an administration that changed its objectives, but 
mainly of the application of multilateral rules that under Argentina’s economic situation, 
clearly signaled the existence of injury. 
 
5. Overvaluation and pressures for shifting to a US-like AD legislation   
  A proposal for reforming AD regulations is contained in Decree 1,088 of 2001. The 
protracted recession that had started in late 1998, and the important overvaluation discussed 
in Section II, was major factors pushing entrepreneurs to seek a more protectionist 
legislation. The pressures were also exacerbated by the highly publicized and politicized 
US AD and CVD measures against honey imports from Argentina
33. This investigation had 
ramifications over many honey producing provinces, and over thousands of beekeepers 
both of whom faced serious problems in meeting the information requirements and 
deadlines established by the US Department of Commerce (Nogués 2003)
34. Decree 1,088 
was drafted in this atmosphere of recession, currency overvaluation and animosity. Under 
these unfavorable circumstances, the same Minister of Economy that had  signed Decrees 
766 (creation of CNCE), and 2,121 (liberal AD regulations) in 1994, concluded in 2001 
that it made little sense to continue implementing AD regulations that provided foreigners 
and in particular the US, more lenient treatment than what Argentina’s exporters were 
receiving abroad. The natural reaction was to adopt US-like regulations - included in 
Decree 1,088 -, such as: (i) shorter time periods of the different stages of AD and CVD 
investigations, particularly in the opening stage and, (ii) the adoption of retroactive 
provisional measures and retrospective final AD and CV duties
35.   
  In spite of the fact that Article 71 of Decree 1,088/01 stated that it would become 
legally binding on January 1, 2002, it never did. In late December 2001 and amidst a major 
economic and social crisis, the President of Argentina resigns and in early 2002, a new one 
is sworn in. As shown in Figure II.1, by then the devaluation process had been set in 
motion, and the RER had started its path of accelerated climbing. Later in 2003, strong 
growth resumed. Under these conditions, the pressures for reform lessened, and the new 
economic team concluded that the time for implementing the changes of Decree 1,088 had 
not arrived. Now the expectation is that most likely, this Decree will never be 
implemented
36.    
 
6. Summing-up 
During the early years of the reform program when the country had not yet signed 
the Tokyo Codes, what was not in the books (things like no time limits for deciding on the 
opening of investigations, political determination against accepting protectionist demands, 
                                                 
33 AD measures were also requested against imports from China. At the peak of the tensions, an important 
number of beekeepers gathered at Plaza de Mayo to demonstrate against the US investigation.  
34 A request by the Minister of Economy to the US Secretary of Commerce to soften the AD measures, had a 
negative response on the basis that these are decisions taken at technical and not political level (Nogués 
2003).   
35 On retroactive measures, it is of interest to quote the then Secretary of Foreign Trade in a newspaper article 
commenting the reforms: “through the retroactive application of measures, industry is assured that protection 
against unfair trade is provided since the date that the investigation is opened..” (Giorgi 2001).  
36 One hypothesis is that the existing regulations have proved to be capable of supplying the protection that is 
demanded by the least competitive industries.   20 
processing costs, and high likelihood of negative injury determinations), were of great 
importance for distilling “frivolous” petitions for AD measures.  
When in late 1994, the government put into effect the new WTO AD regulations, it 
lost much of the discretion that it had in the previous legislation; for example, it could no 
longer decide or delay the initiation of investigations with as much freedom as it used to 
have. As a consequence, since around 1995 but particularly after 1998, most of the petitions 
for AD measures have ended in formal investigations.   
Having opted for the adoption of multilateral rules, the government searched for 
ways of preventing that the AD and SG mechanisms would be co-opted by special interests. 
Towards this end, it passed liberal AD legislation and created the CNCE that would 
administer injury reports in AD, countervailing, and safeguard investigations. The 
government believed that managing injury investigations on a technical basis – within the 
regulations established by WTO – was the key to maintaining discipline over use.  
At the technical level, Argentina’s experience with conducting injury tests was a 
success and the CNCE did a professional job. On the dumping side, the ceramics tiles case 
points to the lack of resources available for measuring dumping margins more than to a 
lack of professionalism. Argentina’s management of pressures for protection on a technical 
basis was however less successful. The delicate macroeconomic problems exceeded the 
capacity of the instrument to distinguish likely deserving from undeserving petitions; in the 
situation that existed, dumping and injury reports tended more often to document the 
“right” of the petitioner to protection than to refute it. Pressures on the AD mechanism were 
heightened by the Mercosur where safeguards are banned; relief from imports coming from 
Brazil has been provided essentially through AD measures. Under these conditions, the 
technical standard tended to support restriction and increasingly, the AD mechanism 
became a reliable instrument for petitioners. It is nevertheless of interest to note that in 
several instances, even during the recession years, the government resorted to the liberal 
aspects of the legislation, such as the implementation of lesser duties, in order to graduate 
the protectionist effects of AD measures.  
Over the 1995-2004 experience, the evidence indicates that in terms of the share of 
negative determinations, Argentina’s AD mechanism has not delivered less protection than 
those in other countries that are either administered with independent commissions like the 
US, or centralized AD mechanisms like Mexico. Nevertheless, the experience of Argentina 
is successful across a significant dimension: in spite of the weight of negative 
circumstances, there has been a resolve of successive governments to hold the line against 
import restrictions. Also, today there are far fewer and more transparent trade restrictions in 
place than had been the experience in previous restructurings of the exchange rate when 
trade liberalization measures were fully reverted by resorting to higher tariffs and several 
obscure and arbitrary instruments (Nogués 1986). 
Finally, a visible attempt at eroding the mechanism only came in 2001 after more 
than three consecutive years of recession and currency overvaluation. The tensions under 
these circumstances were heightened by the honey case that illustrated how other WTO 
members like the US, used the capacity of the multilateral rules to provide more effective 
AD protection than Argentina did. Nevertheless, following the 2002 devaluation and 2003 
growth experience, demands for more protectionist regulations and AD measures have 
lessened significantly and apparently, neither the government nor the private sectors 
continue to push for the adoption of US-like regulations. We take this as another indication 
of a determination to hold the line.    21 
V.  Safeguards  
 
Regarding the use of safeguards for fine-tuning the trade liberalization program, the 
experience of Argentina can be summarized as quite unsuccessful. Before the UR 
agreements came into effect, the country could restrict imports at ease and no safeguard 
regulations were necessary. This explains why during the initial years of the trade 
liberalization program, the government increased barriers at the border in order to facilitate 
adjustment of some industries like footwear, textiles and clothing. This freedom to fine-
tune the liberalization program came to an end when the UR agreements began to be 
enforced in 1995, and successive adverse WTO Panel Reports reduced the margins for 
using safeguard measures. 
For these industries, the safeguard instrument that was used was the so-called 
minimum specific import tariffs or, “derechos de importación específicos mínimos” 
(DIEM’s)
37. The equivalent ad-valorem tariffs of the DIEM´s was often above 35% so 
when the UR came into effect in 1995, trading partners requested Argentina to reduce them 
in line with the “maximum tariff” that the country had binded in these negotiations. After 
consultations ended with negative results, trading partners initiated a case in the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO
38.  
In what follows we comment on the experience with safeguards under GATT 
Article XIX and the Safeguard Agreement, as well as with the textile safeguards under the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). 
 
1. Safeguards under GATT Article XIX and the SA 
Table V.6 shows that there have been 13 petitions under the Safeguard Agreement 
of which: i) seven were turned down by the CNCE before initiation, ii) one was withdrawn 
by the petitioner, iii) one was returned to the petitioner on the basis of insufficient 
information and, iv) four resulted in the opening of investigations; safeguard measures were 
introduced in three of them: footwear, canned peaches and small motorcycles. In the fourth 
case, the toy industry, the CNCE determined at the end of the investigation that safeguards 
were not applicable.  
We have undertaken interviews in order to understand why so few safeguards were 
processed by the CNCE. Some of the factors mentioned include: (i) the injury test in 
safeguard cases is more demanding than in AD cases, (ii) the domestic industry has to be 
able to show that it can overcome its competitive disadvantages by implementing a plan of 
structural reforms (in the cases of toys, cardboard and bicycle tires, for instance, the 
evidence was not strong enough to argue that these requirements could be met), (iii) in 
                                                 
37The DIEM’s are minimum specific duties defined for the target products. These duties are applied whenever 
they are higher than the collections from the ad-valorem tariffs. The regulations established that the DIEM 
would not be charged whenever it was lower than the duties collected through ad-valorem tariffs. It is also of 
interest to note that the resolutions that implemented the DIEM’s acknowledged the plans and actions by the 
protected industries to invest and reconvert. Therefore the objective behind these barriers, were similar to 
those sought by safeguard measures without being called in this way.  
38 Consultations requested by the US in 1996 led to the formation of the Special Group:  “Argentina - 
Medidas que afectan a las importaciones de calzado, textiles, prendas de vestir y otros artículos”. This group 
established the incompatibility of several DIEM’s and finally, the Apellate Body issued its decision on March 
of 1998. A similar request against Argentina was also presented by the European Union (EU).    22 
some cases, the domestic industry accounted for only a small fraction of the market with 
most of the apparent consumption being supplied by imports (in toys for instance, this was 
a factor included in the assessment of the CNCE), (iv) the fact that safeguards are closely 
watched by the WTO implies that a careful evaluation of possible demands for trade 
compensation has to be undertaken; when an industry like camping gear is considered to be 
able to reconvert without safeguards, the CNCE turned down the petition and finally, (v) 
the WTO dispute in one of the first safeguard cases processed by the CNCE (footwear), 
raised fears that other cases could follow.   
   
Table V.6 
Outcome Safeguard Petitions  
Year of 
Petition  Product   Notes 
 
1996  Footwear  Positive injury determination 
1997  Toys  No investigation initiated 
1997  Bicycle tires  No investigation initiated 
1997  Ham  Withdrawn  by petitioner 
1997  Toys  Final negative determination  
1997  Camping gear  No investigation initiated 
1997  Cardboard  No investigation initiated 
1999  Tires  No investigation initiated 
2000  Electronic 
converters  No investigation initiated 
2000  Small motorcycles  Positive injury determination 
2000  Canned peaches  Positive injury determination 
2001  Nuts and bolts  Turned down by formality 
problems 
2002  Wheat gluten   No investigation initiated 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information presented in 
www.mecon.gov.ar/cnce and interviews. 
 
          Of the three industries where Argentina adopted safeguard measures (footwear, small 
motorcycles, and canned peaches), two were taken to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
Footwear was the most visible case and on the basis of particular interpretations of WTO 
regulations, the Panel issued a decision against Argentina (Baracat and Nogués 2005). On 
the other hand, Argentina also lost the dispute against its measures in favor of the canned 
peach industry.  
         The evidence from Argentina’s experience with safeguards under GATT Article XIX 
and the WTO Safeguards Agreement (SA), suggests that the government tried to operate 
safeguards as an economic instrument to facilitate the adjustment of industries damaged by 
increased imports but successive cases lost in WTO disputes acted as a barrier. This barrier   23 
has been interpreted by Sykes’ (2003)
39, argument that the WTO dispute settlement process 
never found a thread of economic reasoning on which to build its interpretations against 
safeguards. This interpretation helps to understand the outcome of the WTO dispute in the 
footwear case (Baracat and Nogués 2005).  
 
2. Textile and clothing safeguards  
          Since 1993, the textile and clothing industry had also benefited from the DIEM’s 
whose equivalent ad-valorem duties were in many cases, above 35%. When the UR 
agreements came into force in 1995, several trading partners noted the inconsistency with 
Argentina’s obligations and in response, the government attempted to provide protection on 
the basis of the transitional safeguard measures contemplated in the ATC.  
Table V.7 shows the seven petitions for safeguards under this agreement: the CNCE 
found evidence of serious injury in only three cases: cotton textiles, polyester fibers, and 
polyester textiles. The other cases were turned down either because the request had not 
satisfied the procedural requirements, or simply because the information contained in the 
petitions indicated that the supporting evidence was  too weak to merit these measures. 
 
Table V.7 
Safeguards under the ATC  
Year of 
Petition 
Product  Notes 
1998  Cotton textiles  Positive injury 
determination 
1998  Polyester fibers  Positive injury 
determination 
1998  Polyester textiles  Turned down  
1998  Polyester textiles  Positive injury 
determination 
1998  Rugs  Turned down  
1998  Fine textiles  Turned down  
1998  Wool and synthetic fiber 
pullovers  Turned down  
Source: Authors´s elaboration based on information of CNCE. 
 
          In order to understand the outcome of these safeguards, it is important to remind that 
the ATC seeks to dismantle the protection system under the Multi Fiber Agreements 
(MFA). As such, the measures regulated by its Article 6, are transitional safeguards that 
should be allowed only in exceptional and well justified cases. Under these requirements, 
the WTO Textile Monitoring Body (TMB) that clears these measures has taken a restrictive 
view and under these conditions, Argentina had to dismantle practically all of the measures 
it had imposed.  
As was the case with the footwear industry, Argentina’s textile producers were hard hit 
by the trade liberalization cum currency overvaluation. In addition, the lower wages in 
                                                 
39 “In the absence of any coherent theory as to when safeguards should be allowed, it is absurd to expect 
WTO members to produce a ‘reasoned and adequate explanation as to how their measures are in compliance 
with the law” (Sykes 2003).   24 
Brazil was another negative external factor for this industry. In the end, textile producers 
had to face the full burden of adjustment as they were stripped from the possibility of 




Argentina’s experience with safeguard investigation shows in the first place, that in 
assessing the safeguard petitions, the government followed a cautious economic approach. 
The CNCE took the leading role in turning down thirteen of the twenty petitions for 
safeguard protection both under GATT 94 Article XIX, and under Article 6 of the ATC. In 
spite of this careful approach, of the three cases that received safeguard protection under  
GATT Article XIX and the SA, two (footwear, and canned peaches) were turned down by 
the WTO DSB (dispute settlement body). Likewise, the Textile Monitoring Body (TMB) of 
the WTO turned down almost all of the transitional safeguard measures that Argentina had 
introduced in order to ease the adjustment process of textile producers. In short, the trade 
liberalization program was implemented under a system of regional and multilateral rules 
that practically made no room for the use of safeguards. We consider that this is a serious 
drawback that is likely to have back slashed against future liberalization attempts
41.  
Also, the case of Argentina appears to be a clear example where the frustrations 
with safeguards, has shifted demands for contingent protection to AD measures. We doubt 
that this is the type of outcome that negotiators were seeking when they drafted the WTO 
AD and SG agreements. We also doubt that this is the system of multilateral rules that will 
facilitate future trade liberalization attempts.   
 
 
VI.  Lessons 
 
Argentina’s trade liberalization policies of the early 1990s were significant and, 
together with other important components of the reform program, played a major role in 
changing the economic trends of the country. Until 2001-2002 when trade policies were 
only partially reversed, the economy experienced the longest period with an open trade 
regime that it has seen in several decades. In relation to the previous experience, it is during 
these years when the demand and supply for antidumping and safeguards measures 
increased considerably. Our objective in this final section is to summarize the main lessons 
from our analysis of the factors that determined the use of these measures.  
 
Liberalization and contingent protection 
Unlike previous attempts, the trade liberalization policies that started to be 
implemented in the late 1980s have withstand the test of time; in some cases as the 2001-
2003 period, turbulent times from which the country is only now emerging. Our conclusion 
is that along the adjustment process, AD and SG measures offered some importrelief but 
                                                 
40 The evidence from the media indicates that this industry has regrouped in order to resist any further 
liberalization proposals. In this regard, the absence of a workable safeguard instrument has had negative long-
run effects.  
41 We also note from Table V.6, that after 2000, there have been only two new petitions for safeguards under 
Article XIX. We take this is an indication that the business community has given up its expectations that it 
can rely on this instrument.     25 
unlike past attempts, the latest liberalization policies have only been partially reversed by 
these or other measures. Our lesson here is that the country has realized that isolation is not 
good economic policy, and has accepted international discipline over trade policy in spite 
of the fact that some multilateral rules do not make economic sense. 
 
Currency overvaluation and contingent protection  
A misaligned exchange rate will make it impossible to sustain a technical approach 
to antidumping and safeguard investigations that calibrate on degree of displacement.  In a 
situation of macro balance, injury analysis separates the few from the many; in a situation 
of imbalance the many are judged deserving of protection. Argentina made an explicit and 
careful attempt to isolate its trade remedies from protectionist interests through liberal rules 
and professional analysis. In 2001, after more than two years of recession and currency 
overvaluation, policymakers stretched the limits of the trade regime by increasing the tariff 
rates for consumer goods to the maximum allowed under its WTO obligations. This same 
situation, which increased imports beyond sustainable levels, resulted in a high share of 
technical reports by the CNCE indicating that an increasing number of industries were 
suffering serious injury. Following the devaluation of 2002 and strong growth in 2003, the 
number of AD and SG initiations declined significantly and now these instruments are 
functioning in an environment where they can distinguish better the petitions for protection.   
  
Flexibility of WTO-based AD regulations 
  Important efforts in terms of time and resources were invested in order to ensure 
that the AD legislation would distill “frivolous” petitions for protection. In spite of these 
efforts, the lesson from the experience of Argentina indicates the tremendous flexibility that 
WTO-based AD regulations have for adapting to the political and economic cycles. 
Argentina maintained a technical approach to AD investigations, but as the economy 
worsened, the mechanism delivered information signaling the need for increasing 
protection and this happened without changing a single comma of the regulations. 
Argentina adopted several of the more liberal options allowed by the rules and although 
they did not prevent implementation of measures, the liberal provisions, such as lesser 
duties, resulted in lower AD barriers.  
 
Political economy implications of multilateral safeguard regulations  
Essentially during and following the implementation of the trade liberalization 
program, Argentina functioned without a safeguard mechanism. Because of the high 
standards required for their application and the lack of an economic basis in the 
jurisprudence that has been established by the WTO appeal body, safeguards under GATT 
Article XIX and the SA, as well as the textile transitional safeguards, were nearly useless to 
the business community. The tentative lesson is that the political economy of these high 
safeguard standards may in the medium run work against further trade liberalization 
programs and/or in favor of the establishment of more obscure barriers.  
It is of interest to compare the WTO rules on safeguards with the WTO rules for the 
special agricultural safeguards demanded by industrial countries when they accepted the 
tariffication of non-tariff measures under the Agreement on Agriculture (WTO 1996). This 
tariffication had practically no liberalization in it (Anderson 1996), and still special 
agricultural safeguards were necessary to “sell” the shift of policy instruments to the 
agricultural interest groups of OECD countries. The big difference is that unlike GATT   26 
Article XIX safeguards, the special agricultural safeguards have automatic trigger 
mechanisms.  
 
Safeguards and AD in the Mercosur 
  Given the ban on safeguards for intra-Mercosur trade, policymakers and the 
business community have resorted to antidumping and other more obscure forms of non-
tariff-barriers (Berlinski 2001). Argentina’s experience indicates that it made no reserves 
for its sensitive industries either in the Uruguay Round, or in the Mercosur negotiations. 
Because of this, the government continues to face demands for import relief from relatively 
labor-intensive sectors. As the Brazilian industry has sufficient industrial capacity to 
overwhelm Argentine producers, under Mercosur’s trade regulations, this country has a 
privileged position. The lesson here is that Argentina should have either made reserves in 
the Mercosur, and/or should have negotiated a special regional safeguard as the Andean 
Community has (Reina 2004). The current situation has created and will continue to create 
frictions, and/or what is worse, will result in the establishment of ad-hoc measures like 
voluntary export restraints.  
 
Political determination and the demand for AD protection  
Another lesson refers to factors having negative impacts on the number of AD 
petitions. In addition to the obvious like the legal costs and time involved in an 
investigation, other factors like the political determination not to process AD petitions 
while the economy was still under high inflation in the early 1990s, and the unbounded 
time that officials had to open an investigation under the previous regulations, had negative 
effects on the demand for AD measures. Although it is impossible to determine with 
precision how many companies/industries considered to submit a petition and in the end 
decided against, it is of interest to note that by the consideration of one key informant, 
around 50% of all potential petitions were finally not submitted. This is a clear example of 
the role played by the perceptions of the business community regarding the policy 
preferences and political determination in favor of openness held by the government during 
the initial years of the trade liberalization program.    
 
Resource constraints   
The administrative and institutional reforms implemented in order to administer the 
WTO AD and SG regulations demanded an important investment in human and financial 
resources. In spite of this, the operating budgets have often been insufficient to do the job 
as expected. For example, because of insufficient funds, in only a handful of cases have in-
situ verifications of dumping margins been undertaken. Likewise, in the creation of the 
CNCE, the government was careful in the qualifications required for staff appointments. 
Nevertheless, this Commission as well as the UGE have not always been successful in 
offering wages attractive enough to retain staff;  there are also clear unmet needs in terms 
of training and infrastructure including information technology. These factors can 
eventually undermine the capacity to maintain a technical approach in the investigations.  
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 ANNEX 1: Information on Argentina’s Antidumping Investigations: 1995-2004 
 
          Injury  Antidumping     
Year of 
Presentation 















01/1995  Fireworks  O  China  30/07/1996  W  +/-  87- 
550 
FD  TC  27/05/1998   
02/1995  Steel ware  S&SP  China  07/11/1995  +  +  81- 
637 
FD  TC  17/02/1998   
03/1995  Metal sheet  S&SP  China  02/11/1995  +  +  208- 
242 
FD  TC  08/10/1997   
05/1995  Atrazine 
(herbicide)  
Ch  South Africa  27/10/1995  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  07/05/1996  C 
06/1995  Pipe parts  S&SP  China, 
Taiwan 
30/10/1995  W  +  ---  ---  ---  14/10/1997   
08/1995  Chain saws  S&SP  China  31/10/1995  +  +  ---  ---  ---  08/10/1997   




20/02/1996  W  +  ---  ---  ---  31/03/1998   
12/1995  Fluorescent 
lamps 
EE  Brazil, Chile  31/10/1995  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  21/08/1996  U 
18/1995  Electromechanic 
products 
EE  Uruguay  07/12/1995  W  -  ---  ---  ---  01/07/1997   
20/1995  Fuses  EE  Brazil  28/12/1995  +  +/-  73- 
449 
FD  DM  16/12/1997   
22/1995  Tire parts  R&RP  Germany  24/09/1996  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  19/06/1997  C 
26/1995  Wheat spaghettis   PF  Chile  27/10/1995  W  -  ---  ---  ---  05/03/1997   
29/1995  Motor 
compressors 
M&NEE  Brazil  17/01/1995  W  -  ---  ---  ---  24/12/1997   
38/1995  Chain saws  S&SP  Brazil  31/10/1995  +  +  ---  ---  ---  06/05/1997   
41/1995  Ceramic magnets  O  Brazil  02/11/1995  +  +  ---  ---  DM  11/04/1997   
52/1995  Drill  M&NEE  China  05/12/1995  +  +/-  208-242  ---  TC  08/10/1997   
56/1995  Milling machine  M&NEE  China, 
Taiwan 
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          Injury  Antidumping     
Year of 
Presentation 















63/1995  DTPA 
pentasodic (40%) 
Ch  Netherlands, 
United States 
28/12/1995  W  -  ---  ---  ---  02/05/1997   
64/1995  EDTA tetrasodic 
(39%) 
Ch  Germany, 
Netherlands, 
United States 
28/12/1995  W  -  ---  ----  ---  05/05/1997   
65/1995  EDTA powder 
calcium  
Ch  Germany, 
Netherlands 
28/12/1995  W  -  ---  ---  ---  05/05/1997   
66/1995  EDTA tetrasodic 
(66%) 
Ch  Brazil, 
Germany, 
Netherlands 
28/12/1995  W  -  ---  ---  ---  05/05/1997   
67/1995  EDTA acid   Ch  Netherlands, 
United States 
04/01/1996  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  01/11/1996  C 
68/1995  Washing 
machine motors 
M&NEE  Republic of 
Korea 
05/12/1995  +  +  27-31  ---  DM  26/01/1998   
69/1995  Color TVs  CD  China  25/04/1996  W  -  ---  ---  ---  20/08/1997   
76/1995  Playing cards  O  China  23/05/1996  +  +  371- 
1033 
FD  TC  17/02/1998   
78/1995  Aluminum 
Chloride 
Ch  United States  23/05/1996  +  -  ---  ---  ---  10/11/1997   
82/1995  Car stereos  CD  China  06/05/1996  W  +  34- 
138 
FD  TC  11/11/1997   
86/1995  Gas carafe  O  Brazil  19/04/1996  +  +  15  FD  DM  26/01/1998   
87/1995  Polystyrene trays  P&PP  Brazil  09/05/1996  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  10/06/1997  U 
90/1995  Gas meters  EE  Italy  27/08/1996  +  -  ---  ---  ---  07/01/1998   
02/1996  Sea sticks  PF  Thailand  28/08/1996  W  -  ---  ---  ---  17/11/1997   
06/1996  Cement bags  W&PP  Brazil, South 
Africa 
23/05/1996  +  -  ---  ---  ---  10/11/1997   
07/1996  Locks  S&SP  China  30/07/1996  +  +  98- 
390 
FD  TC  09/06/1998   
19/1996  Rays & niples  S&SP  China, 
Taiwan 






21/07/1998   
22/1996  Electric isolators  EE  India  30/08/1996  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  22/05/1997  C 
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42/1996  Wood  W&PP  Paraguay  06/03/1997  +/-   +/-  5-50  LD  DM  22/01/1999   
43/1996  Fiber optic 
cables 
EE  Brazil, Spain, 
United States 






18/12/1998   
48/1996  Door locks  S&SP  China  25/03/1997  W  -  ---  ---  ---  30/06/1998   
52/1996  Drill bit  S&SP  Italy  21/02/1997  W  +  113-176  FD  DM  11/09/1998   
68/1996  Gas meters  EE  Brazil  09/09/1997  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  15/04/1998  C 
70/1996  Chain saw blades  S&SP  Sweden, 
United 
Kingdom 
11/08/1997  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  17/05/1999  U 
72/1996  Vaseline  O  United States  16/04/1997  -   N/A  ---  ---  ---  09/01/1998  C 
15/1997  Coated cardboard  W&PP  Germany  27/08/1997  +  +  13-35  FD  DM  26/02/1999   
34/1997  Sea sticks  PF  Republic of 
Korea 
07/01/1998  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  01/09/1998  C 
35/1997  Chains  S&SP  Brazil  11/12/1997  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  12/06/1999  U 
43/1997  Eviscerated 
chicken 
PF  Brazil  25/01/1999  W  +  8-15  FD  DM  24/07/2000   
45/1997  Abrasives  O  Brazil  27/04/1998  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  10/06/1999  U 
31/1998  Tiles  O  Italy  25/09/1998  W  +/-  10-43  LD  DM  17/11/1999   
48/1998  Javelins  O  Brazil  18/02/1999  +  +  39  FD  DM  26/06/2000   
51/1998  Flat laminated 
products 
S&SP  Brazil, 
Russia, 
Ukraine 






09/12/1999   
52/1998  Flat glass  O  China  25/01/1999  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  02/07/1999  C 
61/1998  Wooden hangers  CD  China  24/03/1999  W  +  475  FD  TC  07/08/2000   
67/1998  Denim  T&TP 
 
 
Brazil  29/04/1999  W  +  ---  ---  ---  01/11/2000   
68/1998  Drill bit  S&SP  China  10/06/1999  +  +  199-916  FD  TC  16/08/2000   
69/1998  PVC  P&PP  Mexico, 
United 
States 
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76/1998  Nylon and 
Polyester fabric 
T&TP  Republic of 
Korea 
22/06/1999  +  +  98- 
197 
FD  ---  22/06/2000   


















23/11/2000   
26/1999  Steel sheets  S&SP  Brazil  13/05/1999  N/A  +  ---  FD  DM  05/05/2000  R 
33/1999  Steel sheets 
blades 





S&SP  Brazil, Russia  02/09/1999  +/-   +  ---  LD 
FD 
---  02/03/2001   
44/1999  Pipe accessories  S&SP  China, 
Taiwan 
26/10/1999  N/A  +  104-338  FD  TC 
DM 
12/10/2000  R 
47/1999  Acetate textiles  T&TP  Republic of 
Korea, 
Taiwan 




01/06/2001   





15/02/2000  -  N/A  ---  ---  ---  02/08/2000  C 
54/1999  Polystyrene trays  P&PP  Chile  15/02/2000  +  +  9-17  FD  DM  15/08/2001   
57/1999  Chain saws  S&SP  China  26/10/1999  N/A  +  ---  LD  TC  18/10/2000  R 
62/1999  Hot laminated 
bars 














23/10/2001   
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65/1999  Hot laminated 
steel cross-
sections 
















11/01/2002   
66/1999  Steel disks  S&SP  Spain  02/05/2000  +  +  99-114  LD  DM  30/07/2001   
01/2000  Laminated steel 
or iron products 












30/04/2002   
27/2000  Washing 
machines 
CD  Brazil, 
 Italy,  
Spain 







28/02/2002   
38/2000  Bicycles  CD  China, 
Taiwan 




24/05/2002  R 
39/2000  Granulated steel  S&SP  Brazil, Spain  27/09/2000  +  +  ---  ---  ---  18/04/2002   
42/2000  Fiber glass 
products 
O  Chile,  
South Africa 






18/04/2002   
46/2000  Electrolytic 
copper wire 
EE  Chile  17/08/2000  +  +  9-17  FD  DM  19/12/2001   
47/2000  Steel tubes  S&SP  Japan  15/12/2000  +  +  55  FD  ---  14/12/2001   
57/2000  Rays & niples  S&SP  China, 
Taiwán 




23/07/2001  R 
59/2000  Carafes  S&SP  Brazil  24/01/2001  N/A  +  ---  ---  ---  24/07/2002  R 
62/2000  Phenol panels  O  Brazil  08/11/2000  +  +  ---  ---  ---  09/05/2002   
64/2000  Thermos  CD  China  27/10/2000  +  +  215  FD  TC  29/10/2001   
67/2000  Polypropylene 
fabric 
T&TP  Chile  21/11/2000  +  +  58  FD  DM  22/05/2002   
70/2000  Drill bits  S&SP  Italy  12/09/2000  N/A  +  190-591  FD  DM  10/09/2001  R 
72/2000  Pencils  CD  China  23/11/2000  +  +  735-772  FD  TC  22/02/2002   
74/2000  Drill bits  S&SP  Brazil  30/11/2000  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  31/05/2002  U ANNEX 1: Information on Argentina’s Antidumping Investigations: 1995-2004 (continuation)  34 
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Ch  Japan  22/12/2000  W  +  306  FD  DM  24/06/2002   
76/2000  Playing cards  O  China  14/05/2001  +  +  223- 
2550 
FD  TC  14/11/2002   
77/2000  Poliol  Ch  United States  14/05/2001  +  +  ---  FD  DM  14/11/2002   
78/2000  Chain saw blades  S&SP  United 
Kingdom 
26/02/2001  +  +  ---  ---  ---  27/08/2002   
81/2000  Polyester fiber  T&TP  Republic of 
Korea 
21/05/2001  W  +  13  FD  DM  14/11/2002   
87/2000  Ball bearings  S&SP  China  04/06/2001  +  +  ---  FD  TC  04/12/2002   
88/2000  Syringes  P&PP  China, 
Republic of 
Korea 






05/12/2002   
92/2000  Microwave 
ovens 
CD  China  14/06/2001  +  +  59-69  FD  TC  16/12/2002   
100/2000  Toluene  Ch  United States  21/06/2001  +  +  35  FD  DM  19/12/2002   
30/2001  Plaguicide  Ch  China  22/08/2001  W  +  338-433  FD  TC  26/12/2002   
31/2001  Air conditioners  CD  Brazil, China  22/08/2001  +  +  ---  LD  TC  24/02/2003   
51/2001  Bathroom and 
kitchen faucets 
S&SP  China  10/10/2001  +  +  230-633  FD  TC  11/04/2003   
53/2001  Fiber glass   P&PP  New Zealand  02/10/2001  +  N/A  ---  ---  ---  25/03/2003  U 
56/2001  Pipe accessories  S&SP  Brazil 
China 






11/04/2003   
59/2001  Tires  R&RP  China, 
Indonesia, 
Thailand 








21/03/2003   
60/2001  Stainless steel 
tubes 
S&SP  Brazil, 
Taiwan 




20/05/2003   
69/2001  Glifosato  Ch  China  18/04/2002  W  +  ---  ---  ---  23/09/2003  NI ANNEX 1: Information on Argentina’s Antidumping Investigations: 1995-2004 (continuation)  35 
          Injury  Antidumping     
Year of 
Presentation 















71/2001  Cold laminated 
products 















10/01/2003   
75/2001  Pork meat cuts  PF  Brazil  06/11/2001  W  -  ---  ---  ---  01/08/2002   
77/2001  PVC  Ch  Mexico, 
United States 
18/04/2002  N/A  +  ---  ---  ---  24/04/2003  R 
81/2001  Flat steel or iron 
products 

























27/05/2003   
82/2001  Bicycle tires  R&RP  India  30/05/2002  +  +  25  FD  DM  27/05/2003   
89/2001  Wooden hangers  CD  China  08/08/2002  N/A  +  ---  LD  TC  23/12/2003  R 
94/2001  Thermos and 
similar 
CD  China  29/07/2002  +  +  586  LD  TC  08/01/2004   
10/2002  Starch   O  European 
Union 
06/12/2002  +  -  ---  ---  ---  13/11/2003   
43/2002  Eviscerated 
chicken 
PF  Brazil  26/08/2002  N/A  +  ---  ---  ---  28/02/2003  R 
Notes: 1.Industry abbreviations are as follows: S&SP= Steel and Steel Products; Ch= Chemicals; T&TP = Textiles and Textile Products; P&PP= Plastic and Plastic Products; EE= 
Electrical Equipment; PF= Processed Foods; M&NEE= Machinery and Non- Electircal Equipment; W&PP =Wood and Paper Products; R&RP= Rubber and Rubber Products; CD= 
Consumer Durables; O = Others.  
2. Dates: dd/mm/yr 
3. Duty Criteria: FD- Full duty, LD- Lesser Duty 
4. Methodology: DM- Domestic market, TC- Third country, CB- Cost based 
5. Other symbols: W= without preliminary determination; N/A= not applicable; C= closed; R= revision; U= undertaking; ---: not available and, NI= national interest and case closed without 
measures. 
Source: Authors’s elaboration based on information published by CNCE (www.mecon.gov.ar/cnce), and data provided by the UGE.   
Annex 2 : Administrative Procedures in AD Investigations  
 
Decree 1,326/98 and 1,059/96 include the regulations for administering AD and SG 
investigations such as administrative requirements to be followed by petitioners, the time 
periods allowed for different parts of the investigations, and the criteria applied by 
Argentina when the WTO regulations offers different options. Figure A.1shows the main 
steps to be followed by the the CNCE and the UGE in AD investigations:  
 
(i) Opening an investigation: Before accepting to process a petition, the UGE ensures that 
the information provided is complete. On accepting the petition, a copy is sent to the CNCE 
who prepares reports on three matters: (i) “similar product”, (ii) “industry representation” 
and, (iii) “injury and causation” from dumping to injury. Together with the petition, these 
reports are used by the UGE to determine whether the evidence supports the presumption of 
dumping and injury. This evidence is submitted to the Secretary of Industry and Trade who 
publishes its decision on whether or not to open the case, in the Diario Oficial. Because 
most of the petitions have ended in an investigation, this stage of the process has not been 
used to filter cases.    
 
(ii) Arriving at a preliminary determination: After an investigation is opened, the deadline 
for coming to a preliminary determination on injury and dumping is anywhere from two to 
four months (Article 26 of Decree 1,326/98). Negative preliminary determinations on either 
dumping or injury close the case. Nevertheless, in cases where the evidence is insufficient 
to arrive at preliminary determinations, investigations can continue directly to the final 
determinations. As shown in Annex 1, close to 1/3 of the investigations were completed 
without a preliminary determination
42.  
 
(iii) Arriving at a final determination:  AD investigations must be completed within 12 
months from the date of initiation but in complex cases, this deadline can be extended by 
                                                 
42 Undertakings are regulated by Chapter 5 of Decree 1,326/98. Annex 1 shows that there has been seven 
undertakings out of 111 cases. ANNEX 2: (continuation)  37 
up to six months
43. Before final determinations are reached, the CNCE verifies the 
information that has been presented by national producers, importers and distributors. In 
contrast, because of insufficient budget, the UGE cannot verify the information that has 
been supplied by exporters in order to determine the dumping margins. 
Final positive injury and dumping determinations result in the introduction of AD 
measures. The Minister of Economy, on the basis of the national interest, has the option of 
refusing to impose the measures recommended by the Secretary of Industry and Trade. As 
said, this option has been invoked in only one case: glifosato. 
                                                 
43 Article 30 of Decree 1,326/98 establishes that: “El Ministro de Economía y Obras y Servicios Públicos se 
expedirá al respecto y consecuentemente dictará la resolución final estableciendo o denegando la aplicación 
de derechos antidumping o compensatorios”. ANNEX 2: (continuation)  38 
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on Decree 1,326/ 98.   
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Acronyms 
 
- Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). 
- Antidumping (AD) 
- Asociación Latino Americana de Integración (ALADI) 
- Código Aduanero (CA) 
- Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior de Argentina (CNCE) 
- Common external tariff (CET) 
- Countervailing duties (CVD) 
- Countervailing measures (CVM) 
- Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
- Free on Board (FOB) 
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
- Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) 
- Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur). 
- Multi Fiber Agreements (MFA) 
- Real exchange rate (RER) 
- Safeguard (SG) 
- Safeguards Agreement (SA) 
- Textile Monitoring Body (TMB) 
- U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
- Undersecretary of Gestión Comercial Externa (UGE) 
- Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA) 
- United States of America (US) 
- Uruguay Round (UR) 
- World Trade Organization (WTO) 